Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings, distributions exist for which the seller's optimal revenue is infinite, but the best "simple" mechanism achieves revenue at most one (Briest et al. [2], Hart and Nisan [6]), even when m = 2. This result has long served as a cautionary tale discouraging the study of multi-item auctions without some notion of "independent items".
Even as these approximation results generalized in various directions, they relied on the assumption that the values for the items are drawn independently. While "independent items" is a perfectly natural assumption (and we have greatly deepened our understanding of mechanism design under it), it was never intended to be ubiquitous in all future works. This is especially true due to the nature of the motivating impossibility result: the D witnessing these impossibilities is so carefully crafted that it is far removed from any "real-world" motivation. The thoughtful reader may at this point be thinking: if this construction is so fragile that even a tiny deviation breaks it, perhaps a smoothed analysis might prove insightful. Indeed, this is the focus of this paper.
Given an arbitrarily correlated distribution D, its smoothingD first draws a valuation vector v from D, and then randomly perturbs v tov. We consider two natural models. In the first model,
Our first main result proves that in fact the infinite gap persists in this model! This indeed provides insight in a natural smoothed model and helps explain more clearly where the infinite gap comes from in the constructions of [2, 6] . In the second model, which we call Square-Shift, values (v, w ) are perturbed to (v+ε 1 max{v, w }, w+ ε 2 max{v, w }), where each ε i is drawn independently from U [0, δ ]. Our second main result shows that BRev(D) ∈ Ω(δ · Rev(D)).
Theorem 2. In the Square-Shift model, for a single additive buyer and 2 items
Our results for this model extend to multi-item, multi-bidder settings and settings beyond those where the buyers' valuation functions are additive across the items. It is worth noting that the approximation factor depends exponentially on the number of items (and this is nearly tight), but does not depend on the number of (possibly correlated) bidders.
